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STATE COURT INTERPRETATION OF FOREIGN LAW:
A GUIDE FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS
The application of foreign law is at best a difficult matter; at times it may
present problems sufficiently subtle that they are more easily ignored than
solved. In Mason v. American Emery Wheel Works,' the plaintiff, a citizen of
Mississippi, was injured in Mississippi by the shattering of an emery wheel
manufactured for his employer by the defendant, a Rhode Island Corporation.
The action was brought in the United States District Court for Rhode Island,
which, applying the law of Mississippi, dismissed the complaint. Authority for
the dismissal was a 1928 Mississippi Supreme Court decision holding that such
an action was precluded by the lack of privity between the manufacturer and
the distant user of goods 2 But the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reversed on the ground that a recent dictum in a Mississippi Supreme Court
opinion 3 indicated willingness on the part of that court to reconsider its 1928
holding and follow the modern doctrine of manufacturer's liability enunciated
4
in MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.

The final disposition of the case' is not as interesting as the doctrine under
1241 F.2d 906 (C.A.lst, 1957), cert. denied 355 U.S. 815 (1957).
2 Ford Motor Co. v. Myers, 151 Miss. 73, 117 So. 362 (1928).
3 E. I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Ladner, 221 Miss. 378, 73 So.2d 249 (1954).
4217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
There may be doubt whether a fair reading of the later dictum seriously indicates a
reversal of opinion by the Mississippi Supreme Court. The issue in the Du Pont case, 221
Miss. 378,400-1, 73 So.2d 249, 255 (1954), in which the critical dictum is found, was whether
the manufacturer's negligence was the proximate cause of injury in view of the warning given
to the plaintiff's seller that the goods were definitely dangerous. The court expressly excluded
decision of all issues except proximate cause-even the issue of whether there would have been
liability had the proximate cause been present.
The critical dictum itself is addressed to none of the major issues in the case. It can be read
as simply establishing that a damage to property will be actionable where a similarly caused
personal injury would be.
"Whatever the rule may have been originally, the principle seems now to be well estabished by the decisions of many courts that a person who has had no direct contractual relations with a manufacturer may nevertheless recover from such manufacturer.., in the same
manner that such a remote vendee or other third person can recover for personal injuries."
Id., at 399 and 254.
Even on the question of manufacturer's liability the court indicated that the issue would
be whether the narrower rule of its own imposing liability on manufacturers of food for human
consumption should be extended to cover animal food, id., at 400 and 255, and not whether
the general doctrine of MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co. should be accepted. In fact the Mississippi court never mentioned the MacPherson case nor did it make any mention of Ford
Motor Co. v. Myers, 151 Miss. 73, 117 So. 362 (1928), the case in which it rejected the MacPherson doctrine.
In addition to this the plaintiff in the Mason case was not the distant purchaser of the goods
but an employee of the distant purchaser, and the finding of liability required not merely an
acceptance of the MacPherson doctrine, but an extension of it. It may be that it was the near
universality of manufacturer's liability-that plaintiff could have recovered had practically
any other law than Mississippi's been applicable-that accounts for the federal court's willingness to read Mississippi law the way it did.
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which it was justified. To the court no more was involved than an application
of state law, entirely governed by the principles of Erie.R. Co. v. Tompkins.'
That the law to be applied was foreign to the state in which the court sat had no
influence upon the method of ascertaining that law; the court took upon itself
the problem of interpretation presented by the Mississippi cases rather than
referring to the law of Rhode Island for a guide to that interpretation.
In fact, the court never explicitly mentioned that it was applying the conflicts law of Rhode Island, but only that "the district court, no doubt correctly
under now familiar authorities, deemed itself to be obliged to apply the Mississippi local law to determine the tort liability... .7 And when considering the
effect to be given to dictum, the court made no reference to any possible conflicts problem, but rather referred as authority to a note on the problem of a
federal court ascertaining the directly applicable state law. 8 Reference to the
concurring opinion filed in the case confirms this interpretation of the majority
opinion. In the view of the concurring judge, the court was correct in disregarding the old holding but "in doing so I realize that we present a difficult problem
for district judges when they must apply the Erie doctrineto situations wherein
the considerations as between conflicting holdings and dicta are not as clearly
defined as they are here."
But the case is not simply one in which the federal court must interpret the
law of the state in which it sits. The forum and the events which formed the
basis of the action did not coincide. A choice of law problem was presented to
the District Court of Rhode Island. Under Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Mfg.
Co.,10 the federal court was bound to apply the conflict of law rules of the state
in which it sat; and the force of Klaxon would seem to require that the state
conflict of law rules which bound the federal court were not only choice of law
rules but also those for ascertaining appropriate foreign law. Thus the critical
question is not what the federal court could have done in the Erie situation,
but what the Rhode Island court would have done in the conflicts situation.
But if it is Rhode Island law to which reference must be made, and if the
federal court is ouly to act, in effect, as another court of Rhode Island, then the
result is anomalous. For the result in the instant case is that a Rhode Island
court would strain to interpret applicable Mississippi law so that a Mississippi
plaintiff could recover from a Rhode Island corporation.
It may well be that a federal court sitting in Mississippi, could, in the desire
to follow current notions of justice, so interpret the Mississippi law to find
6304 U.S. 64 (1938).

Mason v. American Emery Wheel Works, 241 F.2d 906, 907 (1957), cert. denied 355
U.S. 815 (1957).
8 Id., at 909. The reference was to Hart and Wechsler, Note on the Ways of Ascertaining
State Law, in The Federal Courts and the Federal System 628-30 (1953).
9
Mason v. American Emery Wheel Works, 241 F.2d 906, 910 (1957) (concurring opinion).
10 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
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manufacturer's liability. But it is quite another thing-and requires more than
an examination of the foreign law-to find that a state court would reach the
same result. What is called for is an analysis of the methods of state courts in
dealing with unclear foreign law rather than an examination of the ways of
federal courts in ascertaining state law.
I
Thus it has been said that the interpretation of applicable law might be different in the state than in the federal courts. This is aside from any problem
which may arise because the federal courts may take judicial notice of state law
while a particular state may still require pleading and proof of foreign law.oa
That is, throughout this comment it is assumed that all pertinent authorities of
the appropriate law are before the court, either by judicial notice or by complete
pleading and proof, and that those authorities, when presented, are unclear.
At first glance it is not then clear why the process of interpreting unclear
law should be different depending upon whether the court is called federal or
state. In the cases that have come up the federal and state tribunals have seemingly treated the problem in the same manner." Both look for expressions or
data indicating how the case would be decided by the courts of the appropriate
jurisdiction. A holding in point is the strongest indication of the applicable law
in the federal 2 well as as state courts.1" Similarly, after some battle it was decided
that the holding of lower state courts was binding on the federal courts; 14 just as
the state forum will normally follow a holding from a lower court of a foreign
jurisdiction. 5
But this similarity is superficial; for the federal and state courts are governed
'OaFor a discussion of the problems arising under the pleading and proof requirement, see
Currie, On the Displacement of the Law of the Forum, 58 Col. L. Rev. 964 (1958); Nussbaum,
The Problem of Proving Foreign Law, 50 Yale L. J. 1018 (1941).
11One court has explicitly stated that to it the problem was exactly the same. An Illinois
appellate court, in deciding a suit against a Delaware corporation determined what the law of
Delaware was by relying on a twenty-three year old decision of the Delaware Chancery Court.
Its justification: "The decision of the Delaware Chancery Court in the Italo case was not
appealed, and, although decided in 1934, so far as we can determine it is the only decision in
that state on the precise question involved here. The Chancery Court of Delaware is at least
equal to the Superior Court of that state, and the federal courts have held themselves bound
by the decisions of the Superior Court where there is no showing that the decision was manifestly in error." Continental-Midwest Corp. v. Hotel Sherman, 13 Ill.App.2d 188, 195-96,
141 N.E.2d 400, 404 (1957).
Erie R.Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938); and see Harnett and Thornton, Precedent in the Eerie-Tompkins Manner: A Decade in Retrospect, 24 N.Y.U.L.Q. Rev. 770,
778 (1949).
13E.g., Adler v. Dickstein, 139 Pa. Super. 447, 12 A.2d 489 (1940); White v. Woodmen of
the World, 87 Utah 477, 50 P.2d 422 (1935).
14West v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 311 U.S. 223 (1940). See also, Fidelity Union Trust v.
Field, 311 U.S. 169 (1940).
15E.g., Moscov v. Mutual Life Insurance Co. of New York, 387 Ill. 378,388-89,56 N.E.2d
399, 404 (1944).
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by basically different capacities and limits when ascertaining applicable law.
There is no federal substantive law of the forum when the federal court is the
forum in a diversity suit; nor is the federal court involved in a choice of law
problem. That there is no such law of the forum follows from the theoretical
underpinnings of ErieR. Co. v. Tompkins in which the Supreme Court swallowed
whole Holmes' theory of what the "law" to be applied was-only that which
had the authority of a sovereign state behind it.1G Thus there is no place elsecertainly not to its own jurisdiction-that the federal court can go but the laws
of the state.
In the same sweep the Court has taken the choice out of the choice of law
problem. Though frequently diversity cases will involve pertinent facts relevant
to more than one jurisdiction only mechanical directions lead to which jurisdiction is to be looked to. The command of the Supreme Court to the federal courts
is clear: apply the law of the state in which you sit; and if any other law must
17
be applied it is to be chosen by the law of the state in which you sit.
In a state court, on the other hand, there are no strict commands imposed
by the Supreme Court. Within the bounds of the Due Process and Full Faith
and Credit Clauses the state court can treat a choice of law problem in its own
manner; all the historic conflicts' devices for arriving at the result one wants to
arrive at are present as they cannot be in the federal courts. And furthermore,
the fact that a state court may have an interest in the outcome of the litigation,
while the federal court has no interest in the result of any particular diversity
suit, may give the state court a greater motivation for exercising the full range
of its alternatives.
II
If there may be a substantial difference in the way a federal court acting
independently will interpret foreign law and the way a state court would make
that interpretation, then the critical question is: how is a federal court applying state conflict of law rules to know what interpretation of foreign law
would have been made by the state court. That is, is there any more involved
than the federal court guessing what the state court would do, or can past
experience show that there are some guides to how the state court will behave? It is the thesis of this comment that there is some predictable standard of
behavior for state courts in their interpretation of foreign law. The remainder
of the comment first, discusses this standard of behavior; and second, examines
a case where a court indicated its responsibility to follow such behavior.
The factors influencing the manner in which state courts may treat unclear
16Erie R.Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 79 (1938). For the classic statements by Holmes,
see Black and White Taxicab Co. v. Brown and Yellow Taxicab Co., 276 U.S. 518, 533-35
(1928) (dissenting opinion); Kuhn v. Fairmont Coal Co., 215 U.S. 349, 372 (1909) (dissenting
opinion).
T
Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
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foreign law are aptly illustrated by the cases below. In Bostrom v. Jennings,18
the Michigan Supreme Court pleaded the lack of clarity of appropriate foreign
law to justify an effective denial of one of the most sacred black letter guides of
the conflict of laws-that the law of the place of a tort determines liability for
the tort.1 9

The parties, both residents of Michigan, were driving through Illinois engaged in a joint venture when the tort occurred. The issue was whether the
negligence of one joint venturer was imputable to the other in a tort suit between them. Admittedly there are rational grounds on which the Michigan
court might have decided to determine this according to Michigan law ° Nevertheless the imagination of the Michigan court was not up to so bold a step; it
was quite certain the law of Illinois, the place of the tort, was the proper law
to apply. But on examining that law the court faced unexpected confusion. To
the Michigan court the Illinois Supreme Court had never spoken on the issue;
and as for the lower Illinois courts, while they had spoken, their language
21
changed with the occasion and was never addressed to the issue before them.
To reach such a conclusion though, the Michigan court had cavalierly to dismiss the strong language of an Illinois Appellate Court, in reference to a suit
between joint venturers, that: ".... if the persons riding in the automobile
were engaged at the time of the accident in a joint enterprise... plaintiff
22
could not recover."
The Michigan Supreme Court, after characterizing this pronouncement as a
dictum, then invoked its own principle that
when a tort action brought in this State is governed by the common or unwritten law
of another State and the latter has not been declared by its courts of last resort with
absolute certainty, we determine the rights of the parties according to the lex fori.2 I
The law of the forum, as announced by the instant case, was that the negligence of one joint venturer would not be imputed to be the other in a tort
Is326 Mich. 146, 40 N.W.2d 97 (1949).
11"[Tlhe law of the place of the wrong determines whether or not there is a cause of action
for the wrong. This is true although both parties are elsewhere domiciled." 2 Beale, The Conflict
of Laws 1289-90 (1935). See also, 15 C.J.S., Conflict of Laws §12(a)(1) (1939).
20 For both parties are domiciliaries of the forum, and the only contested issue is the interpretation of a relationship which began in the forum. See Morris, The Proper Law of A Tort,
64 Harv. L. Rev. 881,885-86 (1951), where the following hypothetical case is discussed: "(4)
that P is aguest occupant, a resident of F, who was offered a ride in F.... It seems at least arguable that in (4) also we should reach more sensible results by applying the law of F rather
than the law of X, since all the significant factors are F factors except the fortuitous place of
the harm."
21

Cases discussed by the court were Brooks v. Snyder, 302 Ill.
App. 432, 24 N.E.2d 55

(1939); Barnett v. Levy, 213 Ill. App. 129 (1919); and Chicago, P. & St.L. Ry. Co. v. Condom, 121 Ill.
App. 440 (1905).
21 Barnett v. Levy, 213 Ill. App. 129, 134 (1919).
23 Bostrom v. Jennings, 326 Mich. 146, 154, 40 N.W.2d 97, 101 (1949).
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action between them. But the device of pointing to the uncertainty of foreign
law to achieve a desired result was not used merely to satisfy general ideas of
justice. All factors in this case pointed to Michigan as the appropriate and rational governing law. The parties were domiciliaries of the forum, and the relationship to be interpreted began in the forum. The court held that the policy of
the forum was that that relationship would not be a bar to recovery. Against
these factors stood only the fortuitous place of injury. Only to serve its own
interests did the court circumvent the orthodox methods of interpretation and
23
decision. a
But uncertainty can take many forms; and minus a holding precisely on
point, it may, as shown by In re Palmer'sEstate 4 be found where the inquiring
court wishes to find it. Respondents, claimants under a will, alleged that a
woman claiming a widow's share had never been legally married to testator. The
woman had been divorced in New York by her first husband on the ground of
adultery, presumably with testator. She and testator, both New York domiciliaries, had then been married in Pennsylvania to escape the New York law and
decree forbidding her remarriage. Respondents attacked the validity of this
marriage under the laws of both New York and Pennsylvania.
There was no difficulty with the objection under New York law, which the
court held could not invalidate a marriage celebrated outside of the state.25
But in determining the validity of the marriage under the law of Pennsylvania
the court had more than a little difficulty; for it seemed to be faced with a
Pennsylvania statute which had never been applied to a case like the one at
hand. The Pennsylvania statute prohibited an adulterer from marrying his or
her paramour during the life of the complaining spouse, 26 and the widow's first
husband had been alive at the time of the contested marriage. However there
was no Pennsylvania case found which had held the statute applicable to nondomiciliaries who had simply celebrated their marriage in Pennsylvania and
then returned to their domicile. True enough, a famous Pennsylvania Supreme
Court case had held that Pennsylvania domiciliaries could not evade the statute
by marrying in another state and then returning to Pennsylvania to live.27 But
2- For the basic analysis of conflict-of-laws decisions in terms of the policy and interests of
the states involved see Currie, Married Women's Contracts: A Study in Conflicts-of-Law
Method, 25 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 227 (1958); Currie, Survival of Actions: Adjudication versus
Automation in the Conflict of Laws, 10 Stan. L. Rev. 205 (19$8); Currie, The Constitution
and the Choice of Law: Governmental Interests and the Judicial Function, 26 U. of Chi. L.
Rev. 9 (1958).
24 192 Misc. 385, 79 N.Y.S.2d 404 (Surr.Ct., 1948).
2- "The law of New York forbidding remarriage of the divorced spouse during the life of the
non-offending spouse is not effective beyond the territorial limits of this state, and a marriage
contracted in another state by such a divorcee which is otherwise valid will be recognized as
valid in New York." Id., at 388 and 407.
2 'a. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 1930) §48-169. "The husband or wife, who shall have been guilty
of the crime of adultery, shall not marry the person with whom the said crime was committed
during the life of the former wife or husband...."
27 In re Stull's Estate, 183 Pa. 625, 39 Atl. 16 (1898).
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this was a far cry from applying the statute to persons whose only connection
with Pennsylvania was formal and fragmentary. The New York court grappled
first with the general conflicts rule that a marriage invalid by the law of the
state of its celebration was invalid everywhere; a rule which would not distinguish between domiciliaries and non-domiciliaries. But the court preferred
Cook 8 to Beale,29 and could not see the wisdom of applying the "domestic
rule" of Pennsylvania when the reason for its application did not exist. Only if
the marriage were "between persons domiciled within the State would [it] offend
the public policy of the State so as to be held void .... -"0 Thus "since the
parties to the marriage are not domiciled in the State of its celebration, and
depart at once to live in the State of their domicile or intended domicile, a conflict-of-laws problem is presented to the State of celebration, and it should
apply as its law in this situation, not its law for its domiciliaries, but its conflicts
law, to wit, the law of the domicile of the parties."'" The conflicts rule then led
to New York, and since there was no New York public policy to void the marriage of an adulteress and her paramour the marriage was valid.32 The New
York court, of course, was not ruling on a case under its own law but was interpreting Pennsylvania law in the absence of Pennsylvania decisions. Its ruling
that Pennsylvania "should apply" was a ruling that Pennsylvania would apply
its conflicts rule, rather than its domestic rule.
Yet the New York court was not to escape so easily-however sensible its
solution might be. On a motion for re-argument it was discovered that there had
been an unpublished opinion of a Pennsylvania lower court, the Court of Common Pleas of Susquehanna County, doing exactly what the New York court
had decided could not be done-the statute had been applied to non-domiciliaries married in Pennsylvania. It was clear from the opinion in the case,
Kalmbacher v. Kalmbacher,33 that the judge did not realize the possible significance of the parties being non-domiciliaries1 4 Nevertheless, the New York
28 Cook, The Logical and Legal Basis of the Conflict of Laws 442-56 (1942). "The only state
which has a real interest, it would seem, is... the 'intended family domicile,' i.e., the state
to which they intend to go and make their home, and to which... they do go and settle
down." Id., at 448.
292 Beale, The Conflict of Laws 674 (1935). "If by the law of the state where the marriage
is celebrated a particular marriage is invalid, there is no marriage, whatever be the law of the
domicile or of any other state."
30 In re Palmer's Estate, 192 Misc. 385, 391, 79 N.Y.S.2d 404, 407 (Surr.Ct., 1948).

1Ibid.
2 Id., at 392 and 410-11.
1363 Pa. D. & C. 195 (C.P., 1945).
34 The Pennsylvania court thought that In re Stull's Estate, 183 Pa. 625, 39 Atl. 16 (1898),
see also text at note 35 infra, which is clearly distinguishable from Kalmbacher, was controlling.
The fact that the parties were foreign domiciliaries was never specifically mentioned, and in
justifying the applicable statute the court said: "The legislature, in furtherance of public
policy and good morals, may impose a disability upon its citizens restricting their right to
contract a marriage." (Emphasis added.) 63 Pa. D. & C. 195, 202 (C.P., 1945).
It may be that had the foreign domicile of the parties been stressed a different result would
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court was now faced with a decision of a Pennsylvania court applying to the
facts at hand. But this was perplexing only for a moment; the New York court
had little doubt which to choose between its interpretation of what the Pennsylvania court would do and what the lower Pennsylvania court had actually
done. For,
... in a matter involving as fine a point as does the instant case, where the highest
court of the State of Pennsylvania has not ruled upon the question, the Kalmbacher
decision does not relieve this court of its responsibility to apply the correct principles
of law as it sees them....

•.. As a matter of principle this court believes that its said decision is correct and that
the law of the domicile of the parties is the law which Pennsylvania
should, and pre5
sumably will, apply as its conflicts law in this situation.3
Thus here was a state court applying foreign law with a vengeance; its underlying rationale as simple as it is extreme--that in the absence of a holding on
point from the highest court of the foreign state the forum has the widest
latitude in determining the content of the foreign law. But clearly the determination here accorded with the policy and interest of the forum. Through all the.
court's intellectual by-paths the motive is clear: to protect citizens of the forum
from the effect of an unjust foreign decision.
rI
But the peculiar effect of Kalmbacherhas also reached the federal courts; and
the reaction of the federal court illustrates the way in which it would be bound
by a state court's interpretation of foreign law. In Lembcke v. United States,'1 the
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit had to determine whether a claimant
under a National Service Life Insurance Policy was a "widow" so as to be in
the permissible class of beneficiaries. The government contended that claimant's marriage to the deceased violated the same Pennsylvania statute involved
in Palmer and KaImbacher. Again claimant and deceased were domiciliaries of
New York, who had been divorced in New York by their respective spouses
for adultery and had then been married in Pennsylvania. Swan, J., writing for
the court, argued persuasively from the statutory history that the Pennsylvania
37
statute should apply only to Pennsylvania residents divorced in Pennsylvania.
have been reached; for the court was reluctant to void the marriage, and seemed to be reaching
for a way out. "It might seem improper to permit petitioner to take advantage of his own
wrong but a reasonable evaluation of the interest of the Commonwealth in the preservation of
good morals and public welfare with reference to marriage as an institution far outweighs any
misgiving on this feature of the case." Id., at 205.
35In re Palmer's Estate, 193 Misc. 411, 413-14, 82 N.Y.S.2d 818, 821 (Surr.Ct., 1948)
(Emphasis added.)
36181 F.2d 703 (C.A.2d, 1950).
371d., at 705.
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But once again KaImbacher raised an obstacle-one which could not be hurdled
with the ease displayed by the New York court.
The court first recognized that if the case were based on diversity of citizenship and the federal court one of Pennsylvania, then there would be no way at
all for the court to avoid KalImbacher,even though the federal court was as convinced as the New York court that that decision was clearly wrong. "In a diversity case the federal court must follow the decision of a state trial court, absent
higher state authority, because where that is the basis of jurisdiction it is inadmissible that there should be one rule of state law for litigants in the state courts
and another for litigants who bring the same question before the courts sitting
within the state."38 On the other hand, if the case were based on diversity of
citizenship, and the court were sitting in New York, it would then have to apply
the conflicts law of New York.39 This would mean, of course, that In re Palmer's
Estate" would become the governing precedent, since it embodied the New York
conflicts rule in the situation, and the New York view of Pennsylvania law
41
would be the view of Pennsylvania law adopted by the federal court.
Thus only in a case in which the federal court is not within the Erie doctrine
in interpreting state law can the court escape the confines of the law and policy
of the state in which it sits. The state court may use with great freedom the
uncertainty of foreign law as a device; but a device with a purpose. When an
archaic choice of law rule calls for the application of the law of the place of the
tort, but contacts and policy rationally call for the law of the forum, then the
forum may use the device to serve its own interest. When the validity of a
marriage involved a policy of the forum, and its citizens are affected, then the
court of forum may plead uncertainty of the foreign law, which might otherwise mechanically have been applied, to achieve a desired result.
When a federal court in a diversity case is faced with the problem of interpreting foreign law it is then not left without guides. The federal court does not
merely have to guess what interpretation the court of the state in which it sits
would make. If there is an interpretation which advances the interests of the
state, then past behavior points to that interpretation as the one which most
likely would have been made.
38

Lembcke v. United States, 181 F.2d 703, 707 (C.A.2d, 1950).

39Id., at 706.
40 192 Misc. 385, 79 N.Y.S.2d 404 (Surr.Ct., 1948).
41However the jurisdiction of the court in Lembcke did not rest on diversity but rather
on the existence of a federal question. Therefore, "we believe the federal court has somewhat
more freedom to differ with the decision of a single trial judge in a state court, although we
confess that no decision on this point has been found." Lembcke v. United States, 181 F.2d
703, 707 (C.A.2d, 1950).

